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1 It is a commonplace in American political
discourse  that  socialists  are  statists,
zealous  to  resolve  society’s  ills  through
the  intervention  of  activist  government.
To  a  nineteenth-century  European  labor
militant,  however,  this  might  come as  a
surprise. The state, as he saw it, was not
there  to  lend  a  helping  hand  but  to
repress,  and  the  gendarme  and  military
man,  not  the  social  worker,  were  its
emblematic  agents.  Late  twentieth
century Third Way socialists on the model
of Tony Blair might also protest. Yes, they
would acknowledge, the state has a role to
play in making for a better world, but so
too does the market. The modern socialist
from this  point  of  view understands the
state  as  one  useful  instrument  among
many and for a certainty does not worship
at the altar of state power. So, the relationship between socialism and the state is not a
simple one and for sure not as simple as stereotyped thinking would have it. 
2 That is the core argument this volume has to make. It consists of twenty-one essays,
each dealing with one aspect  or another of  European socialism’s relations with the
state. The coverage is continent-wide. An essay is devoted to Spain and one to Greece.
The  bulk  of  attention,  however,  is  paid  to  four  cases,  those  of  France,  Germany,
Scandinavia, and the United Kingdom, which together account for more than half of
the contributions. In a short space, it’s impossible to detail what each essay has to say,
but a number of themes recur, and to help identify them, the editors supply synoptic
essays  of  their  own.  The  result  is  a  volume  that  is  both  coherent  and  thought-
provoking. 
3 So, what does the reader learn ? First of all, that the story of European socialism and
the state falls into three periods : the era before the Second World War, the postwar
decades,  and  the  years  of  mounting  crisis  consequent  on  the  globalizing  turn  of
the 1970s.  Each  period  had  its  accomplishments  and  challenges,  but  the  volume’s
overall story arc does not have a happy ending. Socialism, today, is in trouble.
4 Socialists  for  a  long  time  preached  the  gospel  of  revolution,  a  stance  that  created
nagging dilemmas for the more pragmatic-minded among them. Did revolutionaries
engage in electoral politics, serve in government, effect reform ? Didn’t such activities
prop up the bourgeois  state which was a class  state designed to protect  property ?
Socialists knew all too well government’s repressive potential, even in liberal regimes
with  parliamentary  institutions.  In  the  troubled  decade  of  the  thirties,  however,  a
number  of  Europe’s  socialist  parties  set  aside  such  self-questioning  and  assumed
positions of government responsibility. What is most striking about these experiments
in  power  is  socialism’s  consistent  devotion  to  democracy,  to  the  expansion  of  the
suffrage and to  the preservation of  parliamentary norms against  the fascist  threat.
Largo  Caballero,  the  “Spanish  Lenin”  as  he  is  identified  in  Juan Francisco  Fuentes’
essay, was the exception. The cause of social reform was also embraced, but there were
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limits to what could be done. In the Popular Front era, socialists governed in coalition,
and coalition partners were not always keen on making profound changes. In France,
Léon Blum was outflanked on the Left and had to worry about what the communists
would say or do. The era then witnessed reform but not of a system-altering sort. Paid
vacations  enhanced  the  quality  of  life ;  labor  relations  were  improved.  In  Sweden,
however, matters went further. Sweden had not known the revolutionary upheavals
that roiled the rest of Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and so
the state was not looked on with the same suspicion that it was elsewhere. Nor was a
formidable  communist  party  on  hand  to  impose  constraints  as  in  France.  In  fact,
Sweden’s  socialists  found  constructive  helpmates  in  farmers’  parties,  which  made
possible a red-green alliance with enough electoral clout to leverage the socialists into
office as early as 1932. They would not depart until thirty-four years later. Sweden’s
socialists  did  not  promise  revolutionary  transformation  but  a  People’s  Home-style
democratic nationalism, centered not so much on state control of the economy through
nationalizations and planning as on the expansion of welfare provision and corporatist
bargaining among organized interests. 
5 The Second World War marked a watershed in the history of socialism. Socialists had
taken part in the fight against a Nazi-dominated Europe. In the war’s aftermath, they
remained steadfast in defense of democracy and, as such, came to be seen as potential,
even  essential  partners  in  the  West’s  face-off  against  Soviet-bloc  communism.
Electorates warmed to socialist promises of a more just and egalitarian continent, and
entrenched interests found less reason to be fearful. Power beckoned. British socialists
seized the opportunity. Their French and German counterparts were more reluctant to
jettison the Marxist  rhetoric  of  old  but  did  so  in  the  end.  Socialist  parties  remade
themselves  into parties  of  government. The editors’  introductory essay speaks of  a
“socialist acculturation to the modern state” (p. 6). The phrase is an apt one and has
multiple meanings. The first and most obvious has to do with policy. In some instances,
socialists pioneered in welfare-state construction ; in others, they took a back seat to
Christian Democrats. In some instances, they pushed planning, corporatism, and the
mixed economy. In others, less so. But willy-nilly, socialists came to embrace the state
and  what  it  could  do.  By  the 1960s  and 1970s,  they  had  made  themselves  into  the
staunchest  defenders  of  Europe’s  new statist  order,  and,  indeed,  they  were  just  as
staunch partisans of the idea of Europe itself. 
6 As socialists acculturated to the state, socialist parties themselves evolved. The process
began with a change in socialism’s electoral profile. Industrial labor remained its core
constituency,  but  educated  middle-class  voters,  public-sector  workers,  and  civil
servants also flocked to socialism’s banner in ever increasing numbers. A socialist party
was not just a class party but a Volkspartei. The same kind of observation may be made
apropos of party membership. Party leadership had always included some middle-class
types. The school-teacher turned socialist official is almost a cliché. But school-teachers
now found themselves rubbing shoulders with a proliferation of new types : experts,
economists, and even senior civil servants (who were no longer quite so suspicious of
socialist designs as in days gone by). All that muscle, electoral and intellectual, made it
possible for socialist parties, some of them at least, to win outright majorities and to set
the policy agenda without need of partners who might slow things down. The result
was one-party rule, a vast expansion of the state’s activities, and a deepening symbiosis
between state and party. Bernd Faulenbach’s contribution on West Germany in these
years characterizes the SPD as a “Staatspartei” (p. 166). Such intimacy between party
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and power had its dangers, corruption and wastefulness not least among them. A solid
party  culture  rooted  in  memories  of  Red  Vienna  or  buoyed  by  the  inspirational
example of a Jean Jaurès might help militants to sidestep such pitfalls, but this was not
the case everywhere, not in Bettino Craxi’s Italy, as Marc Lazar shows, or in Andreas
Papandreou’s Greece, pace Gerassimos Moschonas. 
7 Overall, however, these were “golden years” for socialists. The phrase is taken from
Kjell Östberg’s essay on Sweden (p. 212). What helped to make them so was not just that
socialists had a clear agenda and the requisite electoral backing to make things happen
but that the times were good. The boom decades of the postwar trente glorieuses were
the backdrop to European socialism’s years of success. But the boom did not last.
8 The oil shocks of the 1970s brought them to an end, ushering in a period of uneven
growth.  Moreover,  growth,  such  as  it  was,  favored  new  industries,  not  the  heavy
manufacturing  sector  of  old,  which  in  fact  shrank.  As  Europe  deindustrialized,  the
unionized,  working-class  communities  that  had  once  been  European  socialism’s
electoral bedrock shrank along with. The financialization of advanced economies, like
those  of  Europe,  didn’t  help  matters.  The  global  financial  webs  in  which  national
economies  found  themselves  ever  more  entangled  imposed  constraints  on  policy-
makers’  room  for  maneuver  and  were  themselves  a  source  of  periodic  instability.
Sebastian  Voigt’s  essay  on  the  fate  of  German  social  democracy  in  the  globalizing
decades post-1970 sums up how these changes effected the way the state functioned. It
became less and less an “engine for reform” and more and more “a crisis manager”
(p. 293).
9 There were also political challenges to face down. A first one had to do with the New
Social Movements that burst on the scene in the wake of the upheavals of 1968. The
militancy of anti-nuclear activists, feminists, greens, and the like reconfigured the Left.
Just as consequential was transformation on the Right. Conservatives proclaimed they
had a solution to the problem of a sputtering growth :  the state needed to tax less,
regulate less, and let the market work its wealth-creating magic. The formula broke
through first in 1979 in Thatcher’s UK and then went world-wide as Reagan’s America
followed suit.
10 Socialists fought over how to respond, whether to stick with the old, statist program or
to  try  something  new.  Everywhere,  socialist  parties  made  adjustments,  above  all
tinkering with party programs to accommodate the demands of new social movement
activists.  In  a  number of  states,  the advocates  of  innovation went  further,  in  Tony
Blair’s UK, for example, or Gerhard Schröder’s Germany. There was a concerted effort
to  chart  a  new  path  forward,  a  Third  Way  between  old-style  statism  and  Reagan-
Thatcher laissez-faire. The welfare state needed streamlining, not jettisoning. The public
sector needed shrinking, though not to the point of disappearance. Looked at one way,
social democracy stayed true to itself,  even as it  adapted to novel circumstances. It
remained, as ever,  committed to democracy and, as ever,  committed to social  well-
being,  although the  target  of  the  state’s  welfarist  largesse  was  changing,  from the
industrial working class to new social groups—immigrants, women, and les exclus.
11 Looked at another way, the Third Way gambit has been a disaster for socialist parties.
Workers more worried about jobs than clean air did not always welcome green policies.
The new and improved welfare state was, it seemed, more concerned about looking
after  the  “improductive”  than  hard-working  citizens  (see  Andersson  and  Östberg’s
essay on Sweden, p. 332). Europe’s working class was contracting, and what remained
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of it was not as loyal to socialism as it had been in former times. Social democracy fared
better with its middle-class constituencies, but there were problems on this front as
well.  Public  sector  workers  and  civil  servants  had  little  incentive  to  embrace
privatization or streamlining of the state, policies that exposed them to the cold winds
of the private sector labor market, if not to outright unemployment. Third Way policies
were often punishing to socialism’s own voters, and they began to vote with their feet,
heading to the Left—to the Greens or to Die Linke—or to an emergent populist Right.
Social democracy lives on in today’s Europe, but it is a shadow of its former self.
12 Fulla and Lazar’s volume has a sobering story to tell. A detail might have been added
here and there. This reader wanted to know more about socialism and the agrarian
question. The end of empire and European construction are themes just touched upon.
But the overall picture is still clear, and it is panoramic. The contributors reflect on a
focused problematic—the question of socialism’s relationship to the state—, but the end
result is something bigger, a grand narrative of socialism’s rise and decline across a
turbulent century and a half.
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